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Conceptualising a protection of liberal constitutionalism post 9/11: 
 an emphasis upon rights in the social contract philosophy of Thomas Hobbes 
 
Ian Turner 
 
Abstract 
 
John Locke believed individuals covenanted with the state, in return for security they 
had previously lacked in the state of nature. But in this bargain of protection, 
individuals still retained fundamental freedoms, such as life, liberty and estate. This 
reflected the fear that the newly created state, whilst also a guarantor of security, was 
also a threat to it. But since 9/11, and the continuation of Islamist terrorism, is the state 
still a significant threat to individual freedom, in the Lockeian sense? Another social 
contract theorist, Thomas Hobbes, vested more power in the state than Locke. With 
modern interpreters of security from the liberal tradition recognising significant 
curtailments of freedom for the very protection of the constitutional state from non-
state actors, such as Islamists, can these interpretations be premised on the limited 
rights granted to citizens by the Hobbesian sovereign? These are the issues which this 
paper seeks to explore. 
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Introduction 
 
John Locke, 1632-1704, believed in the ‘natural’ rights of the individual such as, life, liberty 
and estate. These freedoms were not conferred on individuals by the state but existed anterior 
to it and that states were, in fact, created to secure them. But the security provided by the 
state to enjoy these rights was also itself a threat to the security of the individual.1 It is no 
surprise, therefore, that in the history of the global protection of human rights what has 
preoccupied discourse in the area has been the need for ‘freedoms from’ governmental 
power. In England, for example, there was the Magna Carta, 1215, which conferred the right 
of trial by jury; and the Bill of Rights, 1689, which abolished cruel and unusual punishment. 
In France, there was the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1789, which 
included protection from arbitrary detention, Article VII, and the presumption of innocence, 
Article IX; and in America, there were the first ten Amendments to the Constitution, the Bill 
of Rights, 1791, which included Amendment I, free speech, and Amendment V, the right to 
life, liberty and property. More recently there was the securing of a raft of ‘universal’ human 
rights, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1948, and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966. The horrors committed by the 
regimes of Josef Stalin and Adolf Hitler in the 1930s and 1940s, for example – arbitrary 
killings, enforced disappearances, torture, slavery etc – served to remind us, after World War 
II, of the absolute need for ‘negative’, ‘freedoms from’ protecting individuals from the 
exercise of arbitrary state power. 
 
The principles which inspired human rights declarations in the post-War period are still true 
today because of economic globalisation,2 nuclear proliferation3 and climate change.4 Then 
there are the threats to international peace and security by individual countries: state 
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sponsored terrorism, in the case of Iran;5 the prosecution of the Iraq War, for example, by the 
Americans and its allies in 2003;6 and, following ‘9/11’, America’s response – ‘extraordinary 
rendition’ – permitting the mass abduction, detention and torture of suspected Islamist 
terrorists at remote sites such as Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.7 America’s so called ‘War on 
Terror’ is ongoing and is a continual violator of international human rights law, with the 
targeted killing of individuals by Special Forces, such as the death of Osama bin Laden in 
Pakistan in 2011,8 air strikes9 and the use of drones,10 often with incidental loss of life to 
civilians. Following mass protests by citizens of the Islamic World in 2010-11, against poor 
living standards in the region – the ‘Arab Spring’ – regimes such as Egypt and Syria became 
ever more repressive. The latter, in a long and continuing bloody civil war, used chemical 
weapons against suspected insurgents, including civilians.11 Like the United States, Russia 
and China are permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations, so can 
exercise their veto against collective force to prevent threats to international peace and 
security, as per Article 27(3) of the UN Charter. Russia and China famously vetoed sanctions 
against Syria in 2017, to thwart censure of Syria for its breaches of international humanitarian 
law.12 This inaction by Russia, for example, was unsurprising, since it has a poor record on 
protecting human rights,13 notably its recent armed offensives in Chechnya14 and Ukraine. 
The power of China cannot be overlooked, too,15 with, for example, its continued suppression 
of mass public dissent in Hong Kong. 
 
However, a significant threat to safety and freedom, particularly in countries which account 
for about 75% of the world’s terror atrocities – Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan and 
Syria16 – arguably no longer emanates from government: it comes from non-state actors such 
as Al-Qaeda, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Boko Haram. The European 
region, such as countries within the European Union (EU), is not immune from the security 
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threat posed by third parties such as ISIL either. The Global Terrorism Index 2018 reports 
that the number of terrorist incidents in Europe increased to 282 in 2017, which was itself an 
increase from 2016, when it was 253.17 At the present time, therefore, terrorism, not the state, 
is maybe the greater danger to freedom. 
 
Post 9/11, the human rights debate has been dominated by the competing interests of freedom 
and security. But there is a balance to be struck between the obligation of the state not to 
harm its citizens and its obligation to protect them. Because human rights are largely seen in 
‘negative’, ‘natural’, ‘freedoms from’ – ‘vertical’ – terms, as depicted in the human rights 
instruments stated above, the ‘horizontal’ aspect of human rights – that is, the state’s 
responsibility to protect the individual from human rights abuses committed by third parties – 
is often overlooked. With the ongoing terror threat since 9/11, the traditional attitude to 
human rights, with its emphasis on limiting governmental power, has been challenged by 
more recent approaches to securing the liberal state. Bruce Ackerman, Richard Posner and 
others, for example, position the freedom/security ‘balance’ much more in favour of the state. 
This is to be welcomed. With the greater threat to security perhaps no longer emanating from 
the state, but non-state actors such as suspected terrorists, the author here wishes to found 
these modern approaches to liberal security on the social contract philosophy of Thomas 
Hobbes, 1588-1679. Later critics of Hobbes such as David Hume, 1711-1776, however, 
described the former as a theorist whose politics were ‘fitted only to promote tyranny’.18 
Moreover, Thomas Hobbes had a disciple in Carl Schmitt, the so-called ‘Crown Jurist’ of the 
Nazi Party, who described Hobbes, in 1927, as ‘by far the greatest and perhaps the sole truly 
systematic political thinker’.19 Indeed, even modern experts on Hobbes such as Norberto 
Bobbio imply that Hume’s charge was largely justified: ‘[Hobbes was] not a liberal writer, 
nor a precursor of liberal ideas…The ideal for which he fights is authority, not liberty.’20 
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The reader will be reassured from the outset that this paper is neither a call to tyranny in the 
words of David Hume nor a condonation of the Fascistic sympathies of Carl Schmitt, 
otherwise it would undermine the very democratic ideals such a neo-‘Hobbesian’ model is 
seeking to protect. Indeed, in sacrificing cherished liberal values, by moving the state towards 
either a surveillance state, a security state, or worse, we would be doing the terrorists’ job for 
them, without their related ‘expense’ in resources and manpower. Nevertheless, there are 
claims that Thomas Hobbes was in fact the founder of modern liberalism, emphasising his 
respect for natural rights and the apparent indistinguishability of his sovereign state from a 
liberal constitutional regime.21 There is, therefore, for this author, a ‘beautiful’ paradox to 
Hobbes’s social contract philosophy. Here was a proponent of absolute and unlimited 
sovereignty who, illogically, founded an edifice of authoritarianism – on the consent of its 
subjects: ‘[Hobbes’s] position combined an authority whose commands could not be 
challenged with individual rights and freedoms as the means of establishing and conditioning 
that authority…The combination is striking, not least because…it is bizarre if not downright 
perverse.’22 This piece seeks to navigate some of these obvious contradictions presented by 
Hobbes’s sovereign authority; and, by emphasising the apparent individualism within his 
writing, apply it to contemporary attitudes to security. Thus, the significance and originality 
of this piece is not only premised on the claims that Hobbes’s philosophy legitimises a state 
supportive of the rights and freedoms of its citizens, but that this theory serves to 
conceptualise modern approaches to liberal state protection from non-state actors post 9/11. 
 
This paper is divided into three parts. Before examining Hobbes in detail, the first part of this 
work analyses liberal approaches to security. This analysis is sub-divided into different 
liberal attitudes to security, beginning with the classic approach of John Locke. This paper 
then examines more modern liberal conceptions of security, specifically after 9/11, as 
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represented in the works of David Luban. Luban is then contrasted with other liberal 
exponents, such as Bruce Ackermann, who are much more receptive to the interference with 
individual freedom, because of the Islamist terror threat. Once an assessment of liberal 
approaches to security has been completed, there follows, in the second part of this work, a 
thorough analysis of Hobbes’s social contract theory and its reference to the absolute 
authority of the state and the individuals’ unqualified obedience to it. A natural progression 
from an analysis of Hobbes’s thought are the works of Carl Schmitt, who, with Hobbes, 
shared a very similar approach to ‘constitutionalism’. The concluding section of this part 
warns about the potential dangers to freedoms of embracing Hobbesian – and Schmittian – 
ideals. The final part of this piece concludes with a reappraisal of Hobbes’s thought, 
emphasising the respect for individual rights within his writing. The purpose of this emphasis 
is to present Hobbes as a theorist protective of the liberal constitutional state post 9/11. 
Before doing so, however, it is incumbent to start with an examination of classic approaches 
to security, beginning with the traditional attitudes of John Locke. 
 
Liberal approaches to security 
 
John Locke, the social contract, ‘natural’ rights and limitations on the state 
 
John Locke’s principal work, Two Treatises of Government, which was written between 
about 1679 and 1683, was allegedly a reaction to the government of King James II of 
England. It was not published until 1689, however, after the deposing of James in the 
‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688. Locke sought to effect a civil authority that maintained 
collective peace and order. Pre-the institution of state power, individuals lived in the ‘state of 
nature’ – ‘a State of liberty’ – which was ‘a State of perfect Freedom’ and ‘Equality’.23 
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Individuals in the state of nature had ‘a Right of Self-preservation’, to do whatever they 
thought appropriate for the preservation of themselves and others.24 But why would 
individuals wish to quit the utopia of their ‘empire’, where they were ‘absolute Lord 
of…[their] own Person and Possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body’,25 and 
replace it with the institution of civil government? Locke’s answer: the enjoyment of freedom 
in the state of nature was ‘very unsafe, very insecure’.26  
 
Individuals had a right to punish and/or seek reparation of transgressors of natural law,27 but 
they were judges in their own cause.28 They had natural law to guide them, but ‘for the Law 
of Nature being unwritten…[it is] no where to be found but in the minds of Men’.29 In the 
absence, therefore, of ‘civil’ law for protection, which was enforceable, interpreted by a 
judge, who was not ‘indifferent’ (being the term Locke described judges in the state of 
nature),30 individuals should join together in a commonwealth. This was an original contract 
or ‘compact’ with everyone’s consent.31 The commonwealth acted as one body with the 
power to determine for the majority.32 It then covenanted with a sovereign, chosen by the 
majority, to provide the commonwealth with security.33 
 
‘Natural’ rights of the individual were very important to Locke. In addition to the natural 
rights of self-security and punishment of transgressors of natural law, there were ‘Lives, 
Liberties and Estate, which I call by the general name, Property’.34 The ‘great’ and ‘chief 
end’ of the authorising contract was the preservation of property.35 With Locke prioritising 
property as the chief instrument for the establishment of a sovereign authority, for him, this 
natural right could not be sacrificed without the individual’s consent.36 The natural rights of 
self-preservation and punishment of transgressors of natural law were relinquished on the 
institution of civil society, however.37 
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Interestingly, for the collective protection of property, Locke did not subscribe to the idea of 
the separation of governmental powers in the strict sense, that is, the separation of legislative, 
executive and judicial powers.38 Locke believed in the separation of governmental powers as 
an important principle, but this was primarily a separation of the legislative, executive – and 
federative powers.39  (The function of the federative power was protection from foreign 
enemies and communication with other communities and individuals still in the state of 
nature.40) The legislative and executive powers were largely separate;41 the executive and 
federative powers were less so.42 The judicial power, which was not separate, came under the 
auspices of the legislative function.43 But judges were bound to dispense justice and decide 
the rights of subjects by promulgated standing law.44 And whilst the legislative branch was 
the supreme power of the state,45 it was constrained by natural law46 and could not act in an 
arbitrary way over the lives and fortunes of its people.47 Indeed, for Locke, the purpose of 
law was to secure the freedom of the individual: ‘For Liberty is to be free from restraint and 
violence from others [including the state], which cannot be, where there is no Law.’48  
 
Moreover, Locke believed that the power of the state, or to be exact the power of the 
legislative, was limited to the ‘Peace, Safety, and [the] publick good of the People’.49 The 
state had ‘no other end but preservation’ and, thus, could not ‘destroy, enslave, or 
designedly…impoverish the Subjects.’50 That said, individuals were expected to endure some 
hardship.51 But when the government became too powerful, in that it had breached the trust 
conferred on it, by, for example, invading the ‘Property of the Subject’,52 it had forfeited its 
authority.53 Individuals then had a right of revolution, with a power reverting to them to 
establish a new legislative (or indeed any other branch of government).54 This was ‘not an act 
of revenge; it was an act of restoration, of the recreation of the violated political right’.55 But 
this collective power was not reserved only for situations when the old power had gone – 
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individuals had a right to prevent abuse.56 
 
John Locke advocated a minimal role for the sovereign power. The state of nature before the 
sovereign was ‘very unsafe, very insecure’, so he clearly recognised the threat to individuals’ 
natural rights from others. But Locke’s description of the freedoms enjoyed in the state of 
nature implies that the institution of government was borne out of reluctant necessity (rather 
than a positive desire for citizenship, for example, which can be inferred from the writings of 
another – later – social contract theorist, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1712-177857). For Locke, 
the primary purpose of the social contract was the protection of individuals’ property. 
Property could not be abrogated without consent. On the face of it, therefore, Locke clearly 
does not reflect Thomas Hobbes’s approach to violations of individuals’ natural rights by 
others and sovereign authority which is examined, and contrasted, later.  
 
Liberal approaches to security post 9/11 
 
Modern conceptions of liberal security, particularly following 9/11, have been much less 
dismissive of the freedom/security balance, for example, attempting to reconcile both 
principles to some degree. This is the purpose of a collection of essays, Human Rights in the 
‘War on Terror’.58 That said, one of the contributors to the collection, David Luban, presents 
a particularly strong defence of human rights at the expense of security.59 First, he employs a 
classic liberal view of rights: ‘Security [of the individual] protects our freedom from 
governmental abuse’.60 And it is easy to embrace a security culture when it is not your rights 
that are affected.61 The risks from terrorism are also very small but we are prepared to accept 
a significant loss of freedom.62 He also believes that we are almost in a state of ‘perpetual 
emergency’: ‘9/11’ was an emergency but we are still facing threats to freedom several years 
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later.63 Finally, in response to those that claim destroying democracy does not entitle a person 
to its benefits, he says: ‘The very posing of the rhetorical question already assumes guilt.’64 
 
Another contributor to the collection, Fernando Teson, also attaches significant weight to 
freedom at the expense of security, but appears to draw the line more in favour of the state 
than Luban.65 Teson describes a strict approach to security as a ‘conservative conception of 
security’ and maintains that absolute safety can only be achieved in a ‘police state’.66 He then 
distinguishes ‘Liberalism 1’, where liberties are curtailed to protect security, from 
‘Liberalism 2’.67 Those that subscribe to the latter branch of liberalism are ‘human rights 
absolutists’ who consider that a life with no rights is not worth living.68 But Teson argues that 
those who support the ‘Liberalism 2’ agenda overlook threats that are directed against the 
very freedoms they wish to preserve.69 He believes that the current ‘impasse’ between 
security and freedom is between the strict security approach and ‘Liberalism 2’.70 Breaking 
this impasse, Teson supports ‘Liberalism 1’: ‘I question the view that appeal to liberal values 
can never justify temporary justifications to the current level of enjoyment of freedoms.’71  
 
Further approaches to protecting the liberal state post 9/11 
 
Luban expresses liberal fears about the freedom/security divide, conferring too much power 
on the state at the expense of the rights of the individual. This attitude to state power, even in 
an emergency, is, therefore, in stark contrast to the absolutist state proposed by Thomas 
Hobbes, which is analysed later. Fernando Teson, however, does recognise that liberalism 
must accept some interferences with freedom to preserve liberal constitutionalism from non-
state actors (though, of course, such curtailments are limited and temporary). This is an 
important theme of Richard Posner’s Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of 
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National Emergency.72 ‘Suicide Pact’ is linked to the idea that constitutional rights of the 
individual should be given much less weight where the very survival of the state is under 
threat, otherwise the constitution is a conspiracy with those seeking to destroy it.73 Unlike 
Article 15(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), ‘derogation in time of 
emergency’, for example, the US constitution makes no express reference to crisis powers of 
the state (other than the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus by Congress in section 9, 
clause 2, of Article I74). However, Posner supports a greater balance of constitutional rights in 
emergency circumstances, when the relative weights of liberty and safety change.75 The 
scope of Posner’s limitations in times of crisis include: the indefinite detention of terror 
suspects, the mass surveillance of Islamic extremism, the interception of phone calls and 
emails, even torture.76 Posner’s violation of rights, emphasising prevention, is justified thus: 
‘Because terrorist attacks are potentially so destructive…the emphasis of public policy shifts 
from punishment after an attack occurs to preventing it from occurring.’77 
 
All of this is legitimate, Posner argues, because ‘like any brittle thing, a Constitution that will 
not bend will break’;78 and current Islamist terrorists are ‘…numerous, fanatical, implacable, 
elusive, resourceful, resilient, utterly ruthless, seemingly fearless, apocalyptic in their aims, 
and eager to get their hands on weapons of mass destruction and use them against us.’79 But 
Posner does recognise the seriousness of what he is proposing, thus, his powers of the state 
are limited to terrorism that has the potential to create a national emergency.80 That said, 
because of judges’ ‘knowledge deficit’ regarding security, there should be ‘a light judicial 
hand’ in the accounting of the executive action.81  
 
Moreover, again in direct reference to a lack of crisis powers in the US constitution, Bruce 
Ackerman, for example, suggests that an emergency constitution be developed that provides 
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for effective and short term responses to significant threats of terrorism from Islamists,82 
authorizing the government to detain terror suspects on the basis of reasonable suspicion.83 
To monitor this exercise of state power, Ackerman envisages a ‘Supermajoritarian Escalator’. 
He recommends that the immediate powers granted to the Executive would require the 
support of a majority of Congress after one or two weeks. These would then lapse after two 
months unless reauthorized by 60% of Congress. Two months after a reauthorization by 
Congress would then require a 70% majority to continue the powers; two months after a 
further reauthorization by Congress would require a 80% majority etc.84 He increases the 
supermajorities of the Legislature ‘as a first line of defense against a dangerous normalization 
of the state of emergency.’85 That said, whilst not envisaging unfettered Executive power, 
Ackerman does not propose any judicial controls, unlike Posner, at least in the short term. 
Thus, the rule of law, in particular, holding the Executive to account via the courts, is absent: 
‘With the country reeling from a terrorist strike, it simply cannot afford the time needed for 
serious judicial review. If the President can convince a majority of the legislature of the need 
for emergency powers, this should suffice.’86 
 
Modern liberalism has struggled with the competing claims of freedom and security. More 
‘traditional’ liberals such as Luban seemingly reject the idea of a trade-off between the two 
ideals; others such as Teson are less dismissive of the balancing exercise where the survival 
of liberal constitutionalism is under threat. Posner and Akerman are much more receptive to a 
sacrifice of freedom for the securing of the liberal state – but important safeguards against 
governmental abuse must still be maintained. For Ackerman this is confined to legislative, 
not judicial, regulation. Historically, the social contract theory of John Locke legitimised the 
state as a preserver of the security of the citizen, a protector from others within the state of 
nature. But, at the same time, Locke feared that a conferring of too much power on the 
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sovereign was itself a threat to security, hence the continuation (and deification?) of natural 
rights after the institution of civil government, particularly a right of rebellion if the state had 
become destructive of fundamental freedoms. Although Locke did not criticise Thomas 
Hobbes expressly, there is an acceptance that Hobbes’s approach to the social contract, in 
conferring absolute power on a sovereign body for the purposes of public protection, which is 
discussed in more detail below, was a target of Locke.87 But Hobbes has been the subject of a 
renaissance within elements of liberalism in recent times. In this respect, therefore, is it 
possible to reconcile, at least to some degree, his philosophies of sovereign protection and 
individual rights with the more security orientated approaches of Posner and Ackerman? 
Assuming this to be so, for the purposes, therefore, of utilising Hobbesian theory as a basis 
for conceptualising these modern attitudes to protection of the liberal state post 9/11, the next 
section of this piece analyses the social contract philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. 
 
Thomas Hobbes and his legacy for the protection of the liberal state post 9/11 
 
Thomas Hobbes, the social contract and the Leviathan 
 
Like John Locke, Thomas Hobbes also sought to effect a central authority maintaining 
collective peace and order, but, for Hobbes, the sovereign body was seemingly much more 
powerful. Hobbes’s most famous work is Leviathan.88 The very description of the sovereign 
as a ‘Leviathan’ (or ‘Mortall God’) was telling: it was a reference to Chapter 41 of the Book 
of Job in the Bible. The ‘leviathan’ (or sea monster) is described in terms of its unconditional 
and terrifying power: ‘19 Out of his mouth go burning lamps, and sparks of fire leap 
out…20 Out of his nostrils goeth smoke, as out of a seething pot or caldron…[and] 33…upon 
earth there is not his like, who is made without fear’. 
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Hobbes wrote Leviathan in exile in France between 1647 and 1650, but the book was not 
published until 1651. Unlike Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, Hobbes wrote Leviathan 
during a much more turbulent time in England’s history than the rule of James II: the 
execution of King Charles I, after defeat in the English Civil War, and the start of the 
Cromwellian Commonwealth. Both of these events occurred in 1649. Hobbes was, therefore, 
much more concerned at the evil of state collapse than Locke. Notably, Hobbes’s earlier 
work, The Elements of Law Natural and Politic, written in 1640, but not published until 
1650, under the title of two separate books, Human Nature and De Corpore Politico, was 
written under the absolutist rule of Charles I and the threat of civil war. For this author The 
Elements of Law Natural and Politic serves as a more concise and succinct exposition of 
Hobbes’s social contract theory than Leviathan, so is examined in this piece, too. He also 
believes Hobbes’s De Cive, first published in Latin in 1642, but not published in English until 
1651, is significant in informing a person’s appreciation of Leviathan, so is analysed here as 
well. 
 
Like John Locke, for Thomas Hobbes, there was also a state of nature. But all people in the 
state of nature had ‘a desire and will to hurt’.89 Pre-the existence of civil society Hobbes also 
believed that individuals possessed a natural right of self-preservation.90 This right, thus, 
allowed individuals to do whatever they wanted in furtherance of this self-security.91 Yet, 
because virtually anything might be necessary for one’s self-preservation, this right of nature 
was in practice, for Hobbes, a ‘Right to every thing’.92 The consequence of this right was that 
the state of nature became a ‘War of every man against every man’.93 And life within it 
would be ‘solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short’.94 Hobbes therefore adopted a much more 
malign view of the state of – and human – nature than Locke,95 meaning that the threat to 
individuals’ natural rights from others was much more acute. For Hobbes, as soon as people 
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appreciated this ‘hateful condition, do desire, even nature itself compelling them, to be freed 
from this misery…This cannot be done, except by compact, they all quit that right they have 
to all things’.96  
 
Hobbes also envisaged, therefore, individuals would first covenant between themselves, 
whereby they would all agree to organise themselves into a ‘Common-wealth’.97 There would 
then be a second, authorising covenant which provided the content of the first covenant, 
where the commonwealth would pass from a state of war to a state of peace.98 This second 
covenant entailed the commonwealth agreeing to obey a sovereign chosen by the majority 
(which was one of only three kinds of government: a collection of persons with equal voting 
power, a ‘democracy’; a collection of persons without equal voting power, an ‘aristocracy’; 
or where power had been vested in one person, a ‘monarchy’99). The commonwealth agreed 
to obey a sovereign in exchange for the sovereign authority providing them with ‘common 
peace, defence, and benefit’100 they had previously lacked in the state of nature.101 
  
To achieve ‘common peace, defence, and benefit’, absolute power was vested in the 
sovereign body.102 This absolute power was definitive and unconditional; it was neither 
reversible nor subject to proviso.103 Sovereignty could not be separated, too. Whilst Hobbes 
recognised that the process of government could not literally be undertaken by one person, 
for example, thereby necessitating the appointment of ministers and magistrates, their 
appointment was ‘an inseparable part of the same sovereignty’.104 Indeed, Hobbes was also 
committed to the necessity of the sovereign acting outside the civil law, or even against it, to 
decide what was best for the safety of its citizens.105 For John Locke, an absence of law 
would have been tyranny: ‘Where-ever Law ends, Tyranny begins.’106  
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Unlike Locke, the authorising compact of Thomas Hobbes was between individuals, not 
between individuals and the sovereign power: ‘For while the democracy is a making, there is 
no sovereign with whom to contract.’107  Curiously, therefore, as the sovereign was not a 
party to the second covenant, it did not stand in any reciprocal relation of obligation to its 
subjects, though it was a beneficiary of it.108 Indeed, did Hobbes have much appreciation for 
individual freedom, since he also defined the term narrowly, in that everyone had liberty who 
was not actually physically restrained, liberty being ‘the absence of Opposition; (by 
Opposition, I mean externall Impediments of motion’?109 So if a person were to spend their 
life in subservience and conformity, for fear of the law or what their the sovereign may do to 
them, then according to Hobbes they were still perfectly free in their actions – they did have a 
choice after all.110 
 
The subject’s duty of obedience to the sovereign body was indefinite, which was implicit 
within Hobbes’s third law of nature: the duty to perform covenants.111 The motivation for 
subjects’ honouring the social covenant was Hobbes’s first law of nature, ‘to seek Peace, and 
follow it’.112 (All other natural laws were the means to obtain peace.113) The degree to which 
the citizen submitted to the sovereign power even included a duty to obey the latter’s 
conscience.114 (The state did remain neutral with respect to its citizens’ religious thought, and 
Christianity in particular,115 however. So, in the absence of an express right to manifest one’s 
own religion – a person was expected to follow the religion prescribed by the sovereign in 
public – they did have the right to their own private, theological conscience.) In principle, 
therefore, the absolutist state premised within Hobbes’s works does not naturally serve as a 
protector of liberal constitutionalism post 9/11. The alleged totalitarianism of the Leviathan 
perhaps explains why Hobbes was so attractive to the so-called ‘Crown Jurist’ of the Nazi 
Party, Carl Schmitt, 1888-1985, the Thomas Hobbes of the 20th Century. 
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The Influence of Thomas Hobbes on Carl Schmitt 
 
Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political, first published as a journal article in 1927, and later 
revised as a book in 1932, was significantly influenced by Hobbes: ‘No form of order, no 
reasonable legitimacy or legality can exist without protection and obedience.’116 Furthermore, 
like Hobbes, Schmitt believed that the endeavour of a normal state consists above all in 
assuring ‘total peace’ ie ‘tranquillity, security and order’ within the state and its territory.117 
Again, like Hobbes, Schmitt thought that man was essentially dangerous, though, unlike 
Hobbes, Schmitt thought that there was a state of war between groups or nations rather than 
between individuals.118 For Schmitt, politics was dominated by the necessity of drawing 
distinctions between friend and enemy.119 If the sovereign entity could not at a crucial 
moment distinguish between the two, then it had ceased in the political sphere; and there 
would always be another state which could assume the burden of politics.120 In Schmitt’s 
earlier work, Dictatorship, dating from 1921, he supported the conferring of wide powers on 
the German President to protect the state, at that time, from extreme groups seeking to 
destroy it. Schmitt based the President’s powers on emergency provisions within Article 48 
of the Constitution, 1919.121 Schmitt premised this form of constitutional protection on a 
‘commissarial dictatorship’, in that a commissioner dictator was appointed by the head of the 
state, whose aim was to ‘eliminate the danger and to strengthen the foundation which had 
been threatened’.122  
 
Schmitt was an important critic of liberalism. He believed that it was ill-equipped to protect 
the state from extremist groups seeking to destroy it. Liberalism’s neutrality and tolerance 
exacerbated the potential for chaos. Extremist groups then abused this neutrality and 
tolerance for their own political gain, meaning the liberal state was unable to distinguish 
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friend from enemy.123 In 1932, in Legality and Legitimacy, Schmitt famously provided, 
therefore, the legal and theoretical justification for a much wider use of emergency powers by 
the President under Article 48 of the German constitution.124 Although this Presidential 
‘dictatorship’ had its roots in the 1919 constitution, Schmitt’s conception for it went beyond 
this document, so was no longer within the constitution’s spirit and the letter.125  
 
The dangers of Hobbes, and Schmitt 
 
For reasons of public protection, the author finds a Hobbesian approach to security post 9/11, 
and its Schmittian comparisons, particularly seductive. But these models of protection 
seemingly ignore the reason(s) why we may be conferring greater powers on the state in the 
first place: to protect the very principles of democracy we are seeking to defend. The 
consequence of a substantial sacrifice of human rights is a ‘surveillance state’, a ‘security 
state’ or worse: a ‘police state’. We do not want to do the terrorists’ job for them. Indeed, 
greater security is counter-productive for another reason: there is a danger that the very 
communities whose support is needed in the fight against terrorism will be alienated.126 
Historically, David Hume warned against the tyranny of Hobbes, as did, implicitly, John 
Locke. The consequence of a move to absolutism substantially augments, from a Lockeian 
perspective, risks to the security of the individual. But a significant increase to power of the 
state is also a serious interference with individuals’ autonomy. Another famous liberal writer, 
John Stuart Mill, warned against infringements of freedom merely for the good of the person. 
The state and third parties had a responsibility to prevent harm to the individual but this 
responsibility could not be supported by criminal sanction if the person continued to ignore 
advice. Unless an individual’s actions caused harm to others, they should be free to suffer the 
consequences of their own actions.127 
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In further criticising Thomas Hobbes, he always considered interests of the commonwealth as 
a whole, and assumed, tacitly, that the major interests of all citizens were the same. In time of 
war, of course, there is a unification of interests, but in a time of relative peace, as there is 
now, a clash may be very great between the interests of one class and those of another.128 
Thus, a common criticism of Hobbes is his faith that all the individuals in the commonwealth 
will keep to their promises of obeying the sovereign authority if it turns out to be to their 
advantage later to break it?129 Others have questioned why later generations, who were not 
party to the original covenant, would honour its obligations.130  
 
But there is a certain logic to Hobbes’s seemingly all powerful state. Against the backdrop of 
civil war and the execution of King Charles I, was it unreasonable that Hobbes sought a top-
down approach? Indeed, other absolutist sovereign powers are prevalent in the writings of 
later, social contract theorists, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau. (See, for example, Rousseau’s 
The Social Contract, which was first published in 1762.)131 Notwithstanding the apparent 
logic of Hobbes pursuing the ideas of a strong state, was it actually correct to characterize his 
sovereign body as absolute, even though he himself literally described it as so?132 For 
example, in Hobbes’s day, the image of the Leviathan was not necessarily one of an evil and 
hateful sea monster. Hobbes used this image because he considered it to be an impressive 
symbol, not because he wanted to represent a vile and hideous state. He failed to realise, 
however, that in using this symbol he was conjuring up the invisible forces of an old, 
ambiguous myth.133 Influential writers on Hobbes, such as Taylor, therefore argue that ‘what 
has escaped most observers is the extent to which Hobbes’ absolutism is mitigated by his 
own principles, qualifications, and doctrines’. Hence, Hobbes needs to be ‘saved from 
himself’.134 For reasons of word length this article is unable to examine further the rationality 
of Hobbes adopting a Leviathan to exercise sovereign power; or indeed whether in fact 
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Hobbes’s Leviathan was all-powerful. The author intends to pursue these lines of argument in 
more detail in a follow-up piece. But, even only a brief reference above to some of these 
arguments, supports the recurring theme of this article that the social contract theory of 
Thomas Hobbes arguably did not produce an edifice of authoritarianism and is a foundation 
for the protection of the liberal state post 9/11. 
 
Moreover, parallels have been drawn here between Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt. But in 
the late 1920s Schmitt began to distance himself from Hobbes’s ideas. And in 1932, in 
Legality and Legitimacy, Schmitt famously provided an ‘unconstitutional’ interpretation of 
the German constitution. A year later, in 1933, Schmitt embraced the anti-liberal ideology 
prevalent at the time by joining the Nazi Party.135 Indeed, Strong believes that, immediately 
prior to Schmitt becoming a Party member, he had not even been seeking to protect the 
existing German regime in his writings but, in the Nazis, he saw an opportunity to realise his 
own approach to the absolutist state and install an authoritarian nationalist regime that would 
express the ‘real will’ of the German people.136 So the Schmitt of the 1930s is where this 
piece ceases to rely on comparisons between him and Thomas Hobbes. Indeed, whilst 
subscribing to the strong state ideal of Hobbes (or at least for the Germany of the 1920s), 
Schmitt also sought to expressly distinguish himself from the Leviathan of Hobbes. A 
significant Schmittian source of criticism is The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas 
Hobbes: Meaning and Failure in a Political Symbol,137 from 1938, which McCormick 
describes as an ‘overtly, virulently, almost cartoonish anti-Semitic book.’138 
 
It will be recalled that, for Hobbes, individuals could not surrender their right to private 
judgement on matters of theology, particularly Christianity. This was one of Hobbes’ 
principal flaws, according to Schmitt. In Schmitt’s opinion, this had serious consequences: 
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the space Hobbes reserved for private religious belief became the gateway for the subjectivity 
of bourgeois conscience and private opinion. History had shown that the private sphere had 
extended into the bourgeois public sphere finally overthrowing the Leviathan.139 Stanton 
eloquently describes Schmitt’s criticism of Hobbes thus: ‘By admitting into his arguments an 
ineradicable individualistic component Hobbes was sawing off the branch on which he was 
sitting.’140 For reasons of word length, this piece is also unable to explore in more detail the 
distinctions between Hobbes and Schmitt. This, too, will be explored in a later article. Thus, 
analyses of Schmitt’s other works, such as Political Theology, dating from 1922, where 
famously he decreed that the sovereign had the authority to decide whether an extreme 
emergency was at hand – and, if so, to do whatever was necessary, including suspending all 
legal rules, to secure a normal situation – will be reserved for a future, more detailed 
comparison with Hobbes.141 However, again in briefly distinguishing, here, Thomas Hobbes 
from Carl Schmitt (or at least the Schmitt of the 1930s), in making the latter more absolutist 
than the former, this further supports the ongoing emphasis of this piece on the apparent 
liberalism of Hobbes and his foundation for modern constitutional protection from non-state 
actors. 
 
There are several qualifications to this article because of word length, but the principal aim of 
this piece is to identify rights within Hobbes’s social contract theory. Direct limitations on the 
Leviathan’s power, that is whether the sovereign authority was in fact absolute, which are 
going to be analysed in more detail at a later date, will naturally overlap with an identification 
of citizen’s rights within Hobbesian political thought pursued here. But the objective is to 
keep these two analyses separate, by employing a distinction between express freedoms – 
‘rights’ – which is the purpose of this article, and freedoms inferred from limitations imposed 
on the sovereign’s power – ‘liberties’ – which is for the future. 
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Reappraising Hobbesian social contract theory 
 
The rights of the individual under the Leviathan 
 
Continuing the theme of this piece, this next sub-section considers the freedoms within 
Hobbes, and especially the rights conferred on the individual expressly by the Leviathan after 
the authorising compact. First, it will be recalled, pre-the institution of the sovereign authrity, 
the freedom of the individual was limitless, to exercise their natural right of self-security. 
Equality between individuals was also prescribed by natural law.142 To this end, Douzinas 
proclaims that Hobbes is the ‘founder of the modern tradition of individual rights’.143 For 
Douzinas the law of self-preservation, for example, derived from human nature and as such it 
did not impose external constraints or restrict liberty.144 With this move, Hobbes separated 
the individual from the social order and installed them at the centre, as the subject of 
modernity and the source of law.145 Paradoxically, the citizen’s natural right of self-
preservation was given up to the Leviathan.146 (Equality endured, however, since, being a law 
of nature, it was ‘Immutable and Eternall’.147) But the right of self-preservation – the right ‘to 
all things’ – survived in some form: ‘The Sovereign right retains all the characteristics of the 
individual natural right.’148 For Hobbes, therefore, freedom was crucial, which endured after 
the institution of sovereign authority. 
 
In the first instance, the Hobbesian compact was designed to maintain collective security. 
Security is a basic human right and is essential to the enjoyment of other rights. Of 
significance, Hobbes said: ‘It pertains…to the harmless and necessary liberty of subjects that 
every man may without fear enjoy the rights which are allowed him by the laws.’149 It is no 
coincidence, therefore, that collective security, for the full realisation of human rights, is the 
23 
 
first Article, Article 1, of the ECHR. Individually, after the authorising contract, a person was 
granted the rights to their own life and bodily integrity, which are Articles 2(1) and 3 of the 
ECHR respectively: ‘If the sovereign…command a man…to kill, wound, or maim himself; or 
not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, air, medicine, or any 
other thing without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the liberty to disobey.’150 (Indeed, 
for Hobbes, it was contrary to natural law for an individual to harm themselves: ‘A man is 
forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving 
the same…’151)  
 
There were other express freedoms conferred on citizens, in addition to the rights to life and 
bodily integrity, that resonate with modern human rights law. Hobbes proscribed the 
sovereign power from compelling a citizen to confess to a crime,152 so the use of torture to 
extract a confession from a person was excluded, which is Article 3 of the ECHR. The 
presumption of innocence was assured, which is Article 6(2) of the ECHR. An individual was 
entitled to a fair trial by an impartial adjudicator,153 which is Article 6(1) of the ECHR; and 
retrospective law-making was prohibited, which is Article 7(1) of the ECHR.154 As regards 
punishments for crimes committed, they had to be prescribed by law,155 which is also Article 
7(1) of the ECHR; and punishments out of proportion to the crimes committed, which were 
‘cruel’, and therefore contrary to the laws of nature,156 were also unlawful. Disproportionate 
punishments are also outlawed by Article 3 of the ECHR. The sovereign was also forbidden 
from punishing the blameless (that is, individuals who were not enemies of the 
commonwealth).157  
 
Hobbes was also anxious to ensure that individuals had ‘commodious passage from place to 
place’.158 To modern conceptions of human rights this would constitute a right to be free from 
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arbitrary detention, which is Article 5(1) of the ECHR, or even freedom of movement, which 
is Article 2 of the Fourth Protocol to the ECHR. It will be recalled that whist the creation of 
the commonwealth was with the consent of everyone, so a person acted voluntarily as regards 
to its inception, the commonwealth’s choice of sovereign was by the majority. The 
consequence, therefore, was that the minority was compelled to accept the will of the 
majority. But individuals who did not accept the authority of the majority’s sovereign were 
free to leave (though they did return to the state of nature and were enemies of the 
commonwealth).159 
 
The submission to the Leviathan also ceased when the sovereign body had exceeded its 
authority (those who left the commonwealth, because they disagreed with the choice of the 
majority for sovereign power, also relinquished their unfettered obedience to the Leviathan). 
Like Locke, Hobbes also envisioned a right of rebellion against the state (though this was 
exercised in more extreme circumstances).160 Thus, individuals in the commonwealth had 
rights against the sovereign; the latter’s power was conditional on continuing to guarantee 
individuals’ protection. A sovereign power who could not protect its citizens was simply not 
a sovereign. A return to the state of nature therefore left individuals free to contract with 
another who could provide them with security. For Taylor, this meant that ‘the individual was 
the original and irreducible seat of political authority’.161 Indeed, when the state had failed to 
provide security and the lives of individuals were in danger from the state, for Hobbes, 
individuals then had a right to protect themselves – a ‘right of self-defence’ – from the 
sovereign’s power.162  
 
For Douzinas liberty is at the foundation of Hobbesian philosophy: conflicting natural rights 
lead to the pact, which give birth to the Leviathan, who lays down the law in order to protect 
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and secure individual rights. Civil law is created through the unstoppable advance of 
individual rights; law’s end is the creation of rights. Private rights are the end and value of the 
system of law.163 Douzinas therefore surmises: ‘John Locke’s political writing are commonly 
presented as the early manifesto of liberalism and as the opposite of Hobbes ‘totalitarianism’. 
Yet the main assumptions of Locke did not differ radically from his predecessor.’164 Indeed, 
whilst Hobbes was not a ‘libertarian’ in the mould of later classic liberals such as F A Hayek 
or Milton Friedman,165 he did argue for something close to laissez-faire in some economic 
areas: the sovereign ought to define property rights as clearly as possible and avoid sudden 
and unpredictable taxes.166 In modern day human rights law, this is an example of the express 
right to certainty in the law, which is interpreted within Article 7(1) of the ECHR.167 Legal 
certainty is also another example of the rule of law. 
 
That said, Hobbes saw the accumulation of wealth as a threat to social harmony; individuals 
would not be entitled to amass more than was necessary for their own preservation, if by 
doing so they deprived others of the necessities of life.168 If they did the sovereign was 
required to intervene and redistribute the accumulated wealth.169 The sovereign was therefore 
obliged to guarantee everyone a minimum level of support necessary for their survival: fire, 
water, free air, a place to live, and ‘to all things necessary for life’.170 (Hobbes even believed 
that if someone had committed a crime, because, to do otherwise would threaten their 
survival, then the person’s conduct would be excused.171) Thus, Hobbes’s conferring of rights 
on individuals did not merely extend to classic liberal ideas of ‘negative’, ‘freedoms from’ 
the state, but to ‘positive’, ‘economic’ rights. Prima facie Thomas Hobbes was a state 
absolutist for the purposes of public security. Post 9/11, the liberal state has had to augment 
its powers to cement its survival. A natural consequence of an increase in state authority is a 
reduction in individual liberty. But with a significant respect for human rights within the 
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Hobbesian social contract, and therefore express limitations on the power of the sovereign 
authority, this is arguably a foundation for the modern protection of liberal constitutionalism 
from non-state actors such as Islamist terrorists. Indeed, the classic liberalism of John Locke, 
which conceivably is the antithesis of Hobbesian totalitarianism, was not in fact the absolute 
guarantor of personal freedom one would naturally infer from his writings. 
 
The gulf between Hobbes and Locke, if at all 
 
Douzinas claims that in practice Hobbes’s writings did not differ radically from those of the 
later social contract theorist John Locke. For Hobbes, there was an absence of a separation of 
governmental powers. It has already been noted above, however, that a strict separation was 
even absent from Locke’s theories, too. Of particular note, the judicial branch was not 
independent from that of the legislative.172 Hobbes’s approach to freedoms arguably does not 
sit well with the Lockeian attitude to the deification of ‘life, liberty and estate’ and a minimal 
state to secure these natural rights. This is certainly the case if one were to approach Hobbes 
through the critical eye of Locke. But does Locke deserve to be the lens through which we 
assess Hobbes? The liberal dread of tyranny, emanating from Locke’s apparent fear of an 
absolutist sovereign, is primarily that the state will have its own ideological axe to grind. But, 
for Hobbes, the state was almost definable as the body in a society which had no ideological 
axe of its own.173 
 
In spite of Locke’s perceived rejection of absolutism in favour of maximum liberty, what 
appears to be overlooked is that even Locke conceded that there must be scope for significant 
discretion in some cases. To protect the public good, in ‘unforeseen and uncertain 
Occurrences’,174 the state (or to be exact the Executive branch) had a prerogative that may 
27 
 
sometimes require immediate action ‘without the prescription of the Law’.175 Thus, ‘there is a 
latitude left to the Executive power, to do many things of choice which the Laws do not 
prescribe’.176 Indeed, Locke went further: ‘Without the prescription of the Law, and 
sometimes even against it’ [my italics].177 Moreover, the exercise of this prerogative power 
was never to be questioned.178 Earlier it will be recalled that Locke said: ‘Where-ever Law 
ends, Tyranny begins’.179 In his explanation of prerogative, Locke was clearly being 
hypocritical. This prerogative, according to Neocleous, ‘conveniently allowed Locke to 
ignore the fact that arbitrary power was precisely the kind of power his theorising was 
designed to prevent’.180 Neocleous concludes that this Lockeian approach was ‘nothing less 
than a liberal prioritising of security’, suggesting that liberalism, rather than being in 
opposition to security, was in fact wedded to ideals of security as a way of protecting the 
status quo.181  
 
Moreover, in Schmitt’s particular criticism of liberalism in the Concept of the Political he 
argued that liberals of all countries had in the most different ways coalesced with non-liberal 
elements and ideas.182 A classic example could be John Locke’s condonation of slavery, 
being a shareholder in a slave trading company, the Royal African Company.183 Locke even 
went further: he drafted the Constitutions of Carolina, 1666, to accommodate slaves as 
property, since this advanced the economic system of the day.184 This apparent double 
standard of Locke is one of the alleged contradictions of liberalism – liberalism downgrades 
some interests to protect itself.185  
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Conclusion 
 
Thomas Hobbes foresaw an unqualified submission to the sovereign’s powers in return for 
state protection. He had apparently little interest in liberal considerations of the social 
contract, such as the protection of individual freedoms, the separation of powers etc. For 
Hobbes the compact was seemingly reduced to the surrender of all a person’s rights. 
Furthermore, the sovereign was not a party to the authorising covenant between individuals, 
so a reclamation of an individuals’ gifted freedoms seemingly relied on the sovereign’s whim 
to re-grant them. Censorship for the common good was also permitted. Thus, critics of 
Hobbes such as David Hume described him as a philosopher whose politics were ‘fitted only 
to promote tyranny’. Assuming such an interpretation of Hobbes’s statist philosophy is 
correct, his theories would surely be rejected by modern liberals such as David Luban. Post 
9/11, Luban has been sceptical about the trade-off between rights and security, since, for him, 
it is an unfair exercise: the rights of the minority are given up for the security of the majority. 
Indeed, greater powers of the state become normalised, resulting in a state of perpetual 
emergency; and once liberties are sacrificed states are reluctant to relinquish them, even when 
the security threat has diminished. 
 
But, unlike John Locke, who was reluctant to abandon the utopia that was the state of nature 
for fear that the newly instituted sovereign power was itself a threat to the security of the 
individual, Hobbes was arguably much more concerned about the threat from ‘non-state 
actors’. So his conception of the state, and the protection it provided, is particularly 
appealing, especially post 9/11; it can found a theoretical basis for modern approaches to 
protecting the liberal state from Islamist terrorists. Prescribing what its citizens believed and 
read was no doubt a serious interference with individual liberty. But even existing human 
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rights law accepts substantial curtailments on freedom of thought and expression in times of 
either ‘war or public emergency threatening the life of the nation’, as per Article 15(1) of the 
ECHR, for example. And, whilst for Hobbes there was apparently little toleration of 
individuals’ public conscience, citizens were free to hold their own private views on religion. 
This, for the so called ‘Crown Jurist’ of the Nazi Party, Carl Schmitt, was the fissure which 
eventually destroyed Hobbes’s Leviathan from within. For reasons of word length this piece 
is unable to examine in detail whether in fact the sovereign authority of Hobbes was absolute, 
as well as emphasise the differences between him and Schmitt, but the brief references here 
present Hobbes as a theorist (much?) less absolutist than traditionally perceived. 
 
Moreover, Hobbes’s foundation of the state was the very protection of natural rights (albeit in 
the person of the sovereign), like Locke. There were also rights conferred on citizens, such as 
the right to life, bodily integrity and fair trial by an independent adjudicator, as well as a 
prohibition on retrospective law-making and disproportionate, cruel punishments. The 
significance of freedom in Hobbesian philosophy was therefore very important. However, 
even Locke recognised that in exceptional circumstances the state may have to act against 
liberal values for its own preservation: sometimes outside the law, and sometimes even 
against it. An example of this could be the famous action of President Abraham Lincoln 
during the American Civil War in suspending habeas corpus in 1861. This was literally 
unconstitutional, being an act of the President, not Congress, as prescribed by section 9, 
clause 2, of Article I of the US Constitution. But, since Congress was not in session, 
Lincoln’s motive for doing so was in fact to protect the Constitution, not destroy it. If not, the 
failure of the state in sacrificing freedoms for the sake of its own protection would have been, 
to use Richard Posner’s words, a ‘suicide pact’ with those seeking to destroy it.  
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As the Hobbesian social contract retains some significant liberal values after the institution of 
the sovereign authority, is there much difference in practice, therefore, between this and 
modern approaches to the security of constitutionalism post 9/11? With the continuation of 
Islamist terrorism, many academics – some with distinguished liberal backgrounds, such as 
Bruce Ackerman – have in fact openly called for restrictions on the rights of suspects – 
indefinite detention of terror suspects, wide powers of warrantless surveillance, even torture – 
to necessitate the preservation of the liberal state. For Thomas Hobbes, human rights were not 
‘universal’: enemies of the commonwealth were not granted all the same rights as citizens. 
And whilst there was a general prohibition on cruel treatment, torture was condoned for the 
purposes of information, if a person refused to answer questions (though its admissibility as 
evidence in court was excluded).186 Ackerman, for example, advocates minimal regulation of 
the exercise of executive power, excluding judicial review. Thus, for him, the rule of law, in 
particular, ‘the legality principle’, is suspended; Hobbes’s sovereign was also outside civil 
(but not natural) law.187 This reference to an absence of the rule of law, for Ackerman, also 
overlaps with the principle of the separation of governmental powers, too, in that the 
accountability of the executive branch of the state by the judiciary is excluded. Of course, 
Thomas Hobbes also did not subscribe to a division of the sovereign’s authority. 
 
The author does not claim to make extensive comparisons between Thomas Hobbes and 
Bruce Ackerman and Richard Posner. Whilst the torture of captives to extract confessions, 
the use of informants to provide real-time intelligence and the indefinite detention of violent 
political opponents will have been common even in Hobbes’s day, more modern techniques 
of countering terrorism such as the interception of telecommunications and emails and the 
use of satellites and drones would not have been – the author is not ‘comparing like with like’ 
in every situation. But, as the balance for Ackerman and others falls much more in favour of 
31 
 
the state, and the balance, for Thomas Hobbes, falls much more in favour of the individual, is 
it not fair to conclude that the approaches of the two camps – theoretically opposed to each 
other – might in fact meet somewhere in between? 
 
However, in their desire to protect the state from third parties, such as Islamists, Ackerman 
and others are themselves keen to ensure that these exceptional powers of the state are only 
exercised in a national emergency. And the measures they suggest for preventing further 
terrorism such as the indefinite detention of terror suspects, in some cases without judicial 
oversight, imply (a degree of?) proportionality between these curtailments of individual 
freedoms and the prevailing terror threat (or at least at the authors’ time of writing). 
Currently, the terror threat level in the UK, for example, is ‘severe’, meaning an attack in the 
UK is ‘highly likely’. Significantly, even after the horrific terror attacks in Manchester and 
London in 2017, these would not meet the threshold for Ackerman’s ‘Emergency 
Constitution’. Ackerman’s extraordinary powers of the state, exercised only when a serious 
terror attack has taken place, are the exception, not the rule. At the heart of Hobbesian 
ideology is the protection of individuals from the state of nature, which for Hobbes was the 
English Civil War. This was surely an Ackerman exception. Naturally, the conclusion here 
about the rights exercised by citizens after the Hobbesian authorising compact, 
conceptualising modern preservations of liberal constitutionalism, seemingly ignores the 
spectre of perpetual power, even after the Hobbesian sovereign has restored peace. (In a 
further study, which will analyse the apparent absolute nature of the Leviathan, the endurance 
of the sovereign will in fact be disputed.) But, according to contemporary philosophers such 
as Giorgio Agamben, the regularisation of temporary security measures in modern times, 
after an emergency has elapsed, have in fact become the norm within liberal constitutionalism 
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for a number of years.188 For Neocleous, this permanence would be a consequence of 
maintaining the capitalist status quo. 
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